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**Germany after the Unification: the
Exclusive Society?**

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GERMANY AFTER THE UNIFICATION: THE EXCLUSIVE SOCIETY?

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Abstract

On the basis of an exhaustive assessment of the Social Inequality III dataset provided by the International Social Survey programme, this study aims to find a response to the following questions: 1) did the inclusion of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) automatically imply the inclusion of East Germans into the new society? Do East and West Germans benefit of equal possibilities in the new unified state? Which are the perceptions of the two German populations in relation to their possibility of getting ahead and getting rewarded for their efforts in the new state. In other words, is the new Germany perceived as an "inclusive" or an "exclusive" society by its citizens? The analysis conducted in this paper shows that East and West Germans often have two opposite visions of the society in which they live. While West Germans still consider theirs a relatively equal society, which attempts to provide fair and equal opportunities to all citizens (possibly regardless of the region of origin), East Germans continue to be more skeptical on this issue. In particular, East Germans tend to believe more strongly than West Germans that differences in income in the new society are too conspicuous, that they do not get rewarded for their efforts as they should and that the government should work harder to reduce social differences. These results clearly show the persistence of the East-West German cleavage.

Keywords

German unification, East vs. West German attitudes, International Social Survey Project (ISSP), social inclusion/exclusion, political cultures, national identity.

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Introduction

On October 3rd 1990, after many decades of political, economic and social separation, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were finally unified. "Wir sind ein Volk" ("We Are One Folk") became the motto for the creation of a new state, which, after so many years of foreign influences, could finally constitute a society, politically distant from the one introduced after World War II. The political and economic unification of Germany proceeded, however, faster, and was probably more successful, than the social integration of East Germans into the new economic and political system. Fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, numerous East Germans still feel materially deprived. Despite huge political efforts, being an Ossi (East German) or a Wessi (West German) is still a synonym of a different cultural belonging.

Did the inclusion of GDR into the FRG automatically imply the inclusion of East Germans into the new society? Do East and West Germans have access to equal possibilities in the new unified state? How do the two German populations consider their possibilities of evolving and taking part in an economical, cultural and social rebirth of the new state, and what do they expect to achieve and gain from their efforts? In other words, is the new Germany perceived as an "inclusive" or an "exclusive" society¹ by its citizens?

This paper aims to assess these issues by analysing the Social Inequality III dataset provided by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). In particular, Paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 discuss the complexity of German citizenship in terms of national identity and political culture. Paragraph 1.3 provides a brief description of the German economic and social situation, focusing on social and income inequality. Paragraph 2 introduces to the ISSP dataset used. Finally, paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 show and critically discuss the empirical findings.

1.1 A Difficult National Identity

More than ten years after the unification, the "German question" (die deutsche Frage) remains a key concept for students interested in German politics. As Knischewski (1996) correctly outlined, the "deutsche Frage" is not based on a simple issue, but consists in a number of controversial questions, such as the territorial borders of Germany (where does Germany end?), the status of German citizenship (who is a German?), the constitutional and institutional settings of the new German state (what kind of constitution/institution should be introduced in Germany?).

The difficulty of finding an adequate solution to the German question(s) comes from the turbulent history of the country, which, in the post-war aftermath (of World War

¹ The term "exclusive society" was apparently introduced by Lister (1990), while the definition of "inclusive society" is often attributed to Levitas (1998).

II), was split in two separate states with limited national sovereignty. The FRG was divided in three occupied zones (Besatzungszone) under French, English and American control, while the GDR was under Russian occupation. As a consequence of this territorial and political separation, issues of national interest had not only to be discussed at national level, but they also had to find the necessary political support at international level. Not rarely, France, Great Britain, the United States and Russia influenced the final political decisions of the two German states.

With regard to national identity, numerous studies have often highlighted a scarce national pride of West Germans in institutions, in comparison to other European nationalities (Almond and Verba, 1963; Conradt, 1980; Knischewski, 1996; Zimmermann, 1997). This negative trend, a probable consequence of a strong historical memory of the Nazi past and its atrocities, has brought important political repercussions. On the one hand, it has blocked those political decisions, even the most accommodating ones, which, in some way, might have led to unnecessary tensions in the political arena. On the other, it has accentuated the importance of the bargaining process itself.

As Merkel (1995) correctly emphasized, a centralized and interconnected system of collective bargaining has been at the core of the German economic system during the entire post-war period, being responsible for the "low dispersion of wages between individuals, industrial sectors, and small and large firms" (Merkel, 1995, p. 12). A collective system of wage bargaining (Tarifverhandlungssystem) has also facilitated the development of a particular model of capitalism, a *Sonderweg*, neither fully based on *laissez-faire* nor on *ethatism*, which has greatly reduced social differences. With the unification of the country, the unique German model has inevitably come under great pressure, probably exhausting its capacities to reduce social inequality.

The fact, however, that a low level of national pride in institutions has characterized post-war Germany should not lead to the conclusion that national identity is completely absent in this country. Significant more pride, in fact, has been found in the "efficiency" of the German economy (see, for instance, Almond and Verba, 1963) and, in the years following the unification, around the idea of a "constitutional patriotism" (Verfassungspatriotismus²) (Knischewski, 1996, p. 131; Zimmermann, 1997, p. 94). In the first case, large German companies, successful in the global market (such as Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes, Siemens, etc.), have been seen as a positive symbol in which German citizens could finally identify themselves. The re-birth of the German economy, collapsed after World War II, was then associated to the re-birth of the German citizen. In the second case, the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), by introducing the new citizens' rights, promoted the idea of a state that aimed to amalgamate not only the two economic and political systems, but also the persistent social differences.

² The term "Verfassungspatriotismus" was developed by Sternberg (1979, 1990) and Habermas (1981, 1990, 1993).

Article 3 of the German Basic Law, for instance, states that “all persons shall be equal before the law” (1), that “men and women shall have equal rights” and that “the state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist” (2). It also proclaims that “no person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions” and “no person shall be disfavored because of disability”(3) (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2000, Art. 3).

As it can be seen, the message promoted by the new Basic Law was clear enough to avoid any misunderstanding: 1) the unification has the primary objective to create a new state in which no citizen will be discriminated; 2) the state will have full responsibility in ensuring that current differences will be dismantled. In this context, the new Constitution dictated the rules of the new German state on one hand, and aimed to spread a sense of social equality and cohesion on the other; the duplicity of such political scheme embraced the will to converge, under all aspects of community life, the two populations till then so apparently so incompatible.

Briefly, it might be affirmed that, despite the fact that being a “German” inevitably implies a difficult relationship with national identity, in the years immediately following the unification, two main positive factors denoting national pride could be identified: 1) pride in the “economic efficiency” of the country which then, it has been affirmed, has produced the effect to “spill over” into a support for political institutions (see above); 2) pride around the idea of a “constitutional patriotism, that is, on the rules adopted by the German Basic Law, which aimed to define the rights and obligations of the new German citizens. Needless to say, the contemporary economic recession represents a shadow on the future political stability of the country, since it removes the necessary consensus on the political order recently introduced.

1.2. Competing Political Cultures

It has often been argued that political culture and support for democracy are two concepts that go hand in hand (see, for instance, Almond and Verba, 1963, 1980). Fuchs (1998, p.3) reminds, for instance, that “the concept of political culture is associated with the basic assumption that cultural factors determine the action of citizens and consequently have an indirect impact on political structure”. If this pattern is true, then the type of society in which an individual lives creates a set of democratic values and expectations, which will, consequently, influence the individual in his/her future support for a determined political regime.

In the aftermath of World War II, not a single political culture, but two competing political cultures emerged in the FRG and GDR. The political culture of the FRG was based on the liberal model present in Western societies, while the political culture emerging in

the GDR was characterized by the socialist model exported by the Soviet Union (Fuchs, 1998). Consequently, capitalism and communism were not only two political visions, but were also two fields in which two distinct socializing forces were acting in the production of a different set of values and expectations. On the Western side of the Wall, the free market economy focused on individual interests in order to find an adequate response to collective requests. On the Eastern side of the Wall, on the contrary, the central-planned economy emphasized the importance to protect collective interests from egoistic, individual requests.

In order to make a democracy work, and keep it stable in time, however, the set of democratic values and expectations on the regime must be reflected by the performance of the system itself. A regime that only in theory ensures well-being for its citizens will hardly be stable³. With particular regard to the German case, economic development and/or recession has not had the same impact on East and West Germans. Even though both parts of the country are facing a severe economic crisis, there is little doubt that its negative consequences are more dramatic for East Germans, rather than for West Germans. This is likely to have negative repercussions on the attitudes that East Germans will develop on the new unified state.

1.3 The Economic and Social Situation of the Two German States

Despite the existence of slow signs of recovery, the economic and social situation of Germany is still characterized by a negative trend. The growth rate of the German gross domestic product (GDP) dropped from 2.3 per cent in 1992 to -0.1 per cent in 2003, while unemployment increased from 6.4 per cent in 1992 to 9.6 per cent in 2003. The number of long-term unemployed as well as the number of poor people⁴ is also growing. Long-term unemployment raised from 2.2 per cent in 1992 to 4.6 per cent in 2003 (Eurostat, 2004), while the number of poor people increased from 11.4 per cent of total population in 1989 to 13.4 per cent in 2000. Social and income inequality is also growing. The Gini coefficient of Germany was 0.257 in 1989, while it reached 0.264 in 2000 (LIS, 2004).

Differences in economic performance and income inequality are more clearly visible if a separate analysis on East and West Germany is carried out. In 2003, over a total population of 13 million East Germans, 11 per cent were unemployed (1.5 million), while, over a total population of 65 million West Germans, the percentage of jobless people was equal to 4.1 per cent, which corresponds to 2.7 million citizens. Although

³ The academic debate on this topic is extensive and, unfortunately, cannot be covered here briefly. For more information on the modes of regime support see Easton (1965, 1975), Parsons (1951, 1969), Fuchs (1998); on democratic stability and consolidation of democratic institutions see Huntington (1991), Lipset (1960; 1993), Linz (1975), Linz and Stepan (1996), Przeworski (1991).

⁴ The poverty rate here refers to all those people who find themselves below 60% of the median of net disposable income.

significant improvements can be registered in the amount of salary that the two German populations receive, differences continue to persist. In 2003, the average gross wage per worker was equal to 27 000 Euros in the West against 22 000 Euros in the East. This amount, which corresponds to only 80 per cent of the West German remuneration, was, however, much lower in 1991 (the ratio was equal to 56 per cent) (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 2004).

2. The ISSP Project and Methodology

The following section analyses the dataset Social Inequality III (1999) made available by the collaboration between the principal national research institutes of 26 nation members of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP⁵). For the purpose of this study, only East and West Germany have been included in the analysis. The German survey was performed in 2000 by means of a self-completion questionnaire following on from a 45 minutes face-to-face interview. The sample size of the database involves 1432 respondents. In order to provide a better representation of East German attitudes, the ISSP research institution in charge of the survey has deliberately over-sampled the five eastern Federal states. The analysis has primarily involved the variables v4, v5, v6, v7, v34, v35, which correspond to the following questions:

Q1.- How important do you personally think each item is for getting ahead:

(V4) Coming from a wealthy family

(V5) Knowing the right people

[1] Essential

[2] Very important

[3] Fairly important

[4] Not very important

[5] Not important at all

[8] Can't choose

[9] No answer

Q2.- To what extent do you agree or disagree with each statement about getting rewarded:

(V6) People get rewarded for their effort

(V7) People get rewarded for their intelligence and skills

[1] Strongly agree

⁵ Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Rep, France, Germany East, Germany West, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, North Ireland, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United States. For more information on the ISSP project see <http://www.issp.org/>

- [2] Agree
- [3] Neither agree nor disagree
- [4] Disagree
- [5] Strongly disagree
- [8] Can't choose
- [9] No answer

Q7.- How much do you agree or disagree with each statement about differences in income:

(V34) Differences in income are too large

(V35) Government should reduce the differences in income

- [1] Strongly agree
- [2] Agree
- [3] Neither agree nor disagree
- [4] Disagree
- [5] Strongly disagree
- [8] Can't choose
- [9] No answer

The responses have been tested according to the income status of respondents. The aim was to see whether West and East German citizens show different perceptions about their possibilities of getting ahead and of getting rewarded for their efforts in the unified state. In order to have a better picture of income clusters, the original 10 income deciles calculated according to the ISSP classification have been regrouped into three main deciles. The "First Decile" includes respondents belonging to the lowest income groups (deciles 1, 2 and 3). The "Second Decile" includes respondents belonging to the middle-income groups (deciles 4, 5, 6, and 7), while the "Third Decile" includes high-income respondents (deciles 8, 9 and 10). This partition is based upon the suggestions on data presentation provided by the Canberra Group (2001) and should provide a clearer idea of low, middle and high-income earners.

3.1 Empirical Results

During communism, economic and social differences were substantially lowered by the central planned economy, which, with the exception of party bureaucrats, ensured a relatively uniform system of wages and benefits. Enrolled with due caution, the economic system of the GDR could be described as a scheme based on work performance, rather than on property rights, that is that an individual's ranking in the social class was essentially determined by the individual's position in the labour market, rather than by the amount of property owned by the family of origin. As a consequence, an individual

living in a communist society should have no reason to perceive “coming from a wealthy family” a significant factor for the improvement of his/her own social status. In the FRG, on the contrary, the individual’s position in the social class was more uniformly determined by: 1) the individual’s position in the labour market; 2) the property rights that the individual could claim. As a result of this different economic mechanism, it might be expected that an individual born in West Germany should consider coming from a wealthy family a significant factor for his/her future position in the social structure.

How do East and West Germans consider coming from a wealthy family as a necessary precondition for improving his status in the new unified country? In other words, do they find that the new political and economic system provides equal opportunities to all citizens regardless of the property owned by the family of origin? Interestingly, Table 1 shows that more than a fourth of East Germans (27 per cent) against less than one fifth (18 per cent) of West Germans finds “very important” coming from a wealthy family for getting ahead in the new society. This result becomes a bit clearer if the respondents’ income status is considered (Table 1A and Table 1B). In this case, approximately 29 per cent of East Germans in the lowest income deciles (Decile 1-3) against less than 19 per cent of their Western counterparts finds “very important” coming from a wealthy family.

Table 1, Table 1A and Table 1B about here

Knowing the right people can also be a crucial factor for improving one’s status. This empirical evidence, which is often a taboo in numerous European countries (something that exists, but that is better to ignore) was not a new issue even during communism. It is, in fact, well-known, that forms of clientelism did exist even in state-socialist societies, taking the form of “loyalty” to party bureaucrats or state-owned factory managers. In exchange for the respect given to the communist ideology, bureaucrats and local officials were not rarely used to grant access to better houses, family benefits, holidays, etc. Despite the presence of these forms of political and managerial corruption present during communism, a higher percentage of respondents in West Germany should affirm that “knowing the right people” is important for getting ahead in life. The assumption lies in the intrinsically more utopistic nature of communist propaganda, which emphasized hard work as the only determinant factor for getting ahead in life. Contrary to this hypothesis, Table 2 shows that approximately 18 per cent of East German respondents against almost 14 per cent of their Western counterparts finds knowing the right people “essential” (48 per cent of East Germans finds it “very important” against 41 of West Germans). Particularly interesting here is to see what kind

of income groups more strongly support this "alternative way" of getting ahead in life. Unexpectedly, not the people belonging to the lowest income deciles, but rather those in the highest income deciles tend to find "personal contacts" "very important" or "essential" for getting ahead (64 per cent of East Germans in the 8-10 Decile finds it "very important" against 40 per cent of their Western counterparts, while 9 per cent of high income respondents in the East finds it "essential" against 19 per cent in the West) (Table 2A and Table 2B).

Table 2, Table 2A and Table 2B about here

Do people in the new unified Germany get rewarded for their efforts? As it could be expected, East Germans are the less convinced that the society in which they live now provides fair and equal opportunities to all its citizens. Table 3 shows indeed that only 39 per cent of East Germans "agree" on this statement against approximately 50 per cent of West Germans. With regard to the income status, the less convinced are low-income respondents with approximately one-fifth (19.6 per cent) of East Germans who "disagree" on this statement against one-seventh of West Germans (14 per cent) (Table 3A and Table 3B).

Table 3, Table 3A and Table 3B about here

In a perfect, egalitarian and inclusive society people should also get rewarded for their skills. Again, East Germans are more skeptical on this possibility if compared to the opinions expressed by West Germans. Approximately 5 per cent of West Germans "strongly agree" on this statement against 3 per cent of East Germans. Interestingly, however, the majority of West and East Germans still feel that people can get rewarded for their skills (59 per cent of West Germans "agree" against 53 per cent of East Germans). If income status is considered, the highest percentage of respondents who feel rewarded for their skills can be found in the highest income deciles (Decile 8-10) (Table 4A and Table 4B). This result does not surprise, since particularly high income earners are those who have been "successful" in the new economic mechanism.

Table 4, Table 4A and Table 4B about here

Are differences in income in the new Germany too large? Or, in other words, is the new political, economic and social mechanism succeeding in equalizing differences among its individuals? Needless to say, the perceptions of East and West Germans on this issue strongly differ. If the majority of East Germans (44 per cent) “strongly agree” or “agree” (48 per cent) that differences in income in the new unified country are too large, the percentage of West Germans who find the distribution of income unequal is much lower (less than 20 per cent “strongly agree”, while 52 per cent “agree”). In particular, it is interesting to note how East Germans find income differences too large regardless of their financial position (in all income groups, the percentage of those who “strongly agree” with this statement is almost double if compared to that of the West) (Table 5A and Table 5B).

Table 5, Table 5A and Table 5B about here

Who should then be responsible to avoid that these differences in income continue to persist? On this issue, the majority of East Germans agree or strongly agree (26 per cent “strongly agree”; 47 per cent “agree”) that the government should reduce differences in income (Table 5). These percentages are much lower for West Germans (approximately, 12 per cent “strongly agree”, while 35 per cent “agree” on this statement). Interestingly, when income status is considered, not only lowest-income individuals in the East (Decile 1-3) tend to “strongly agree” on an active role of the government in reducing differences in income, but also and, to some extent, unexpectedly, middle-income earners (Decile 4-7). In particular, in these two decile groups the percentages of those who strongly support an active involvement of the state is almost double if compared to their Western brothers (Table 6A and Table 6B).

Table 6, Table 6A and Table 6B about here

3.2 Discussion

What conclusions can be made on the outcome of the study? Is the new German state perceived as an “inclusive” or an “exclusive” society by its citizens? The empirical evidences elucidated so far show that East and West Germans have often two opposite visions of the society in which they live. While West Germans still find their country a relatively equal society, which attempts to provide fair and equal opportunities to all citizens (possibly regardless of the region of origin), East Germans continue to be more

skeptical on this issue. In particular, East Germans tend to believe more strongly than West Germans that differences in income in the new society are too large, that they do not get rewarded for their efforts as they should and that the government should work harder to reduce social differences.

These results confirm the persistence of the East-West German cleavage found in previous studies (see, for instance, Fuchs, 1998; Böhnke and Delhey, 1999a,b; Hofferbert and Klingemann, 2000 and Zapf, 2000). In 1998, Fuchs (1998, Abstract) affirmed, for instance, that "in East Germany a majority of citizens is supporting democracy as well, but have a rather skeptical attitude toward the liberal democracy of Germany. This skepticism results partly from socialization and experiences in the state socialist system of the GDR. These lead to the preference of another model of democracy than the liberal democracy institutionalized in Germany. Considering the acceptance of the liberal democracy of Germany and the values underlying this model of democracy, the "inner unity" of the community of Germans remains still to be seen".

On the basis of a survey conducted in 1997 by the German Paul Lazarsfeld Society and by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Hofferbert and Klingemann (2000), found that the so-called *Wall in the Mind* syndrome⁶ was still clearly visible in Germany (see also Klingemann and Hofferbert 1994). Further analysis conducted on the German Welfare Survey of 1998 (Wohlfahrtssurveys 1998), has revealed that, although the level of dissatisfaction with the living conditions in the unified Germany was decreasing since the first surveys carried out in the beginning of 1990s, it remained higher in the East than in the West (Böhnke and Delhey, 1999a, b; Zapf, 2000).

Thus, how should then the German unification be evaluated? What went wrong? Why do East Germans still feel materially deprived? Unquestionably, the unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 required politicians to find an immediate solution to a very complex issue. On the one hand, the unification of the country was a matter of national politics, since it was the core of the "deutsche Frage". On the other, it became a matter of international relations, since it would have implied the dissolution of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War. In this context, it cannot surprise that questions concerning the inclusion of East Germans in the new Federal State under equal conditions were not issues of primary concern. The political priorities of 1989 required, in fact, firstly, to stabilize the entrance in the post-Cold War era by removing all possible political barriers, and, only secondarily, to deal with issues of "inner unity". In the opinion of many observers, this would have been a problem to discuss in the new elected parliament once the political situation was finally stabilized. Unfortunately, if, on one

⁶ Hofferbert and Klingemann (2000, p.2) use the term *Wall in the Mind* to describe "a mental distance and disaffection that leave western Germans often wondering if the burdens of unification were worth the gain and that leave easterners feeling like second class citizens, with a strain of selective nostalgia for some of the more comforting aspects of the old regime" (see also Klingemann and Hofferbert 1994).

hand, the first political priority of 1989 has successfully been met, transforming the occasional demonstrations of Lysia in the “beginning of the end” of the Cold War, on the other, the inner unity of the country in terms of common national identity, political culture and equality of chances remains still to be met.

Conclusion

The empirical findings of this study show that the new unified Germany is not yet perceived as an “inclusive society” by a significant portion of its population. Needless to say, it might be argued that East Germans should be more grateful to their Western brothers, who have conducted a difficult transition often renouncing to the well-being and privileges they had acquired beforehand. Equally true, however, would be the East German’s claim that companies coming from the West have greatly benefited from the unification of the two economies and, as a consequence, the scores have now been settled. What is crucially stressed here, however, is the context in which the transition is taking place. As already mentioned, a difficult national identity and the persistence of two competing political cultures still characterize Germany after the unification. If the process of state- and institution-building can be addressed as finished, this cannot be affirmed for the process of social unification. Two societies with two different visions of how the state should work still co-exist in Germany.

APPENDIX

Question: Importance: coming from a wealthy family

Table 1 Importance: coming from a wealthy family

% within Country

	Importance: coming from a wealthy famil							Total
	Essential	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Cant choose	No answer	
Germany West	4,6%	18,3%	37,9%	27,9%	7,8%	2,7%	,8%	100,0%
Germany East	4,1%	26,8%	37,2%	21,1%	8,2%	1,6%	1,0%	100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 1A Importance: coming from a wealthy family West Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Importance: coming from a wealthy famil							Total
	Essential	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incorr	3,8%	14,3%	40,0%	22,9%	11,4%	5,7%	1,9%	100,0%
Decile 1-3	7,4%	18,6%	37,9%	24,9%	8,1%	2,5%	,7%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	4,5%	18,2%	36,1%	32,5%	6,3%	2,1%	,3%	100,0%
Decile 8-10		25,5%	38,3%	31,9%	2,1%	2,1%		100,0%
Refused	1,4%	19,0%	40,1%	25,2%	10,2%	2,7%	1,4%	100,0%
No answer			50,0%	50,0%				100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 1B Importance: coming from a wealthy family East Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Importance: coming from a wealthy famil							Total
	Essential	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incorr		28,6%	35,7%	21,4%	7,1%	7,1%		100,0%
Decile 1-3	4,5%	28,7%	35,5%	21,9%	7,5%	1,5%	,4%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	5,1%	19,9%	41,7%	21,2%	9,0%	1,3%	1,9%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	9,1%	27,3%	36,4%	27,3%				100,0%
Refused		36,5%	34,9%	14,3%	11,1%	1,6%	1,6%	100,0%
No answer				100,0%				100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Question: Importance: Knowing the right people

Table 2 Importance: Knowing the right people

% within Country

	Importance: Knowing the right people							Total
	Essential	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Cant choose	No answer	
Germany West	13,7%	41,3%	33,7%	6,5%	2,3%	,8%	1,8%	100,0%
Germany East	18,2%	48,9%	24,5%	4,7%	1,0%	1,4%	1,4%	100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 2A Importance: Knowing the right people West Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Importance: Knowing the right people							Total
	Essential	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incon	10,5%	38,1%	39,0%	6,7%	3,8%	1,0%	1,0%	100,0%
Decile 1-3	18,6%	43,5%	27,4%	6,3%	1,4%	1,1%	1,8%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	13,7%	40,0%	36,4%	5,4%	2,4%	,6%	1,5%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	19,1%	40,4%	25,5%	10,6%	2,1%		2,1%	100,0%
Refused	4,8%	42,9%	38,1%	7,5%	2,7%	,7%	3,4%	100,0%
No answer			50,0%	50,0%				100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 2B Importance: Knowing the right people East Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Importance: Knowing the right people							Total
	Essential	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incon	7,1%	57,1%	28,6%			7,1%		100,0%
Decile 1-3	18,5%	51,3%	20,8%	5,3%	1,1%	2,3%	,8%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	16,0%	39,7%	35,9%	4,5%	1,3%		2,6%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	9,1%	63,6%	18,2%	9,1%				100,0%
Refused	27,0%	57,1%	11,1%	3,2%			1,6%	100,0%
No answer		50,0%	50,0%					100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Question: People get rewarded for their effort

Table 3 People get rewarded for their effort

% within Country

	People get rewarded for their effort							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Germany West	2,8%	50,7%	25,3%	12,9%	2,2%	5,5%	,5%	100,0%
Germany East	1,0%	39,1%	29,7%	16,8%	4,3%	8,0%	1,0%	100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 3A People get rewarded for their effort West Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	People get rewarded for their effort							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incorr	2,9%	46,7%	27,6%	12,4%	2,9%	7,6%		100,0%
Decile 1-3	2,8%	48,1%	25,3%	14,0%	3,2%	5,6%	1,1%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	2,1%	54,6%	24,5%	12,8%	,9%	4,8%	,3%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	4,3%	59,6%	19,1%	12,8%		4,3%		100,0%
Refused	4,1%	46,9%	27,2%	11,6%	3,4%	6,1%	,7%	100,0%
No answer		50,0%	50,0%					100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 3B People get rewarded for their effort East Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	People get rewarded for their effort							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incorr		50,0%	14,3%	14,3%		21,4%		100,0%
Decile 1-3	1,1%	36,6%	29,4%	19,6%	4,5%	8,3%	,4%	100,0%
Decile 4-7		43,6%	30,8%	14,1%	3,2%	6,4%	1,9%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	9,1%	54,5%	9,1%	9,1%		18,2%		100,0%
Refused	1,6%	34,9%	36,5%	14,3%	7,9%	3,2%	1,6%	100,0%
No answer						100,0%		100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Question: People get rewarded for their skills

Table 4 People get rewarded for their skills

% within Country

	People get rewarded for their skills							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Germany West	5,2%	59,3%	18,2%	11,4%	1,0%	4,6%	,3%	100,0%
Germany East	3,3%	53,0%	22,7%	13,7%	2,5%	3,7%	1,0%	100,0%
Total	4,5%	57,1%	19,8%	12,2%	1,5%	4,3%	,6%	100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 4A People get rewarded for their skills West Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	People get rewarded for their skills							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incorr	2,9%	55,2%	18,1%	11,4%	3,8%	8,6%		100,0%
Decile 1-3	6,3%	57,5%	15,8%	13,3%	1,1%	5,3%	,7%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	4,8%	62,7%	17,9%	11,3%	,3%	3,0%		100,0%
Decile 8-10	4,3%	59,6%	19,1%	17,0%				100,0%
Refused	6,1%	57,8%	23,1%	6,1%	,7%	5,4%	,7%	100,0%
No answer		50,0%	50,0%					100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 4B People get rewarded for their skills East Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	People get rewarded for their skills							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incorr	7,1%	57,1%	14,3%	7,1%		14,3%		100,0%
Decile 1-3	3,0%	52,5%	22,3%	14,3%	3,4%	4,2%	,4%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	3,2%	55,1%	23,1%	13,5%	1,3%	1,9%	1,9%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	9,1%	45,5%	18,2%	27,3%				100,0%
Refused	3,2%	49,2%	27,0%	11,1%	3,2%	4,8%	1,6%	100,0%
No answer		100,0%						100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Question: differences in income are too large

Table 5 Differences in income are too large

% within Country

	Differences in income are too large							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Germany West	19,5%	52,8%	13,7%	8,7%	,9%	4,0%	,4%	100,0%
Germany East	44,0%	47,6%	4,3%	2,0%		1,2%	1,0%	100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 5A Differences in income are too large West Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Differences in income are too large							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incom	20,0%	53,3%	16,2%	5,7%		2,9%	1,9%	100,0%
Decile 1-3	23,9%	55,4%	9,5%	5,3%	,4%	5,6%		100,0%
Decile 4-7	15,5%	54,6%	16,7%	10,1%	1,5%	1,5%		100,0%
Decile 8-10	17,0%	27,7%	19,1%	34,0%		2,1%		100,0%
Refused	21,1%	50,3%	11,6%	6,1%	1,4%	8,2%	1,4%	100,0%
No answer		100,0%						100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 5B Differences in income are too large East Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Differences in income are too large							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Cant choose	No answer		
Nap, n force laboral, no income	28,6%	57,1%	7,1%		7,1%			100,0%
Decile 1-3	49,1%	43,0%	4,9%	1,5%	1,1%	,4%		100,0%
Decile 4-7	42,3%	51,3%	2,6%	1,9%		1,9%		100,0%
Decile 8-10	27,3%	63,6%	9,1%					100,0%
Refused	34,9%	50,8%	4,8%	4,8%	3,2%	1,6%		100,0%
No answer		100,0%						100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Question: Government must reduce differences in income

Table 6 Gov. must reduce differences in income

% within Country

	Gov. must reduce differences in income							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Germany West	12,5%	34,7%	16,5%	19,3%	7,1%	8,1%	1,7%	100,0%
Germany East	26,2%	47,0%	13,7%	7,8%	1,4%	2,9%	1,0%	100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 6A Gov. must reduce differences in income West Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Gov. must reduce differences in income							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incom	11,4%	35,2%	17,1%	16,2%	4,8%	10,5%	4,8%	100,0%
Decile 1-3	14,0%	41,1%	16,8%	14,4%	3,5%	8,4%	1,8%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	10,7%	32,5%	18,2%	24,2%	6,9%	6,3%	1,2%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	6,4%	23,4%	8,5%	29,8%	29,8%	2,1%		100,0%
Refused	16,3%	30,6%	13,6%	17,0%	8,8%	12,2%	1,4%	100,0%
No answer		50,0%	50,0%					100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

Table 6B Gov. must reduce differences in income East Germany

% within New Respondent's Income

	Gov. must reduce differences in income							Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Cant choose	No answer	
Nap, n force laboral, no incom	21,4%	57,1%	14,3%			7,1%		100,0%
Decile 1-3	30,2%	46,0%	13,6%	5,3%	1,5%	2,3%	1,1%	100,0%
Decile 4-7	24,4%	46,2%	16,7%	9,6%	,6%	1,9%	,6%	100,0%
Decile 8-10	9,1%	45,5%	9,1%	18,2%	9,1%	9,1%		100,0%
Refused	19,0%	52,4%	6,3%	12,7%	1,6%	6,3%	1,6%	100,0%
No answer			50,0%	50,0%				100,0%

Source: Author's calculations from ISSP 1999, Social Inequality III

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